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In recent years the number of going private transactions has sharply increased in emerging 
markets. The purpose of this study is to establish the financial characteristics of companies 
that have gone private using a dataset from Poland. We use a probit model to distinguish the 
difference between firms that went private and companies that did not. We find that the 
probability of going private grew with a rise in the concentration of foreign ownership, an 
increase in the relative level of free cash flows, a decrease in the level of long term debt, and a 
decrease in the liquidity of share trading. The results obtained are important both for investors 
wishing to identify entities characterized by a high likelihood of going private and for 
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1. Introduction 
The Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) in Poland was recreated in 1991 after more than 
fifty years of inactivity caused by the Second World War and the introduction of a centrally 
planned economy thereafter (Czerniawski, 1992). Seven years after its reactivation the first 
going private transaction took place. Following this transaction, several dozens of going 
private transactions have been made to date. Thus a logical question arises in these 
circumstances as to the reasons for this phenomenon, considered typical of developed 
markets, occurring in such a young market. The answer to such a question is made more 
difficult by the fact that, due to the specificity of the post-communist economy, the usefulness 
of  theories published in the literature explaining the reasons for going private should be 
perceived as limited. Given the very different nature in market characteristics and institutional 
background between developed and emerging countries, this study seeks to examine an 
interesting issue. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II provides a brief  description of going 
private transactions in Poland.  In Section III hypotheses are derived based on previous 
empirical research that explains the motives for and the characteristics of Polish going private 
companies. Section IV presents the data and methodology used. Section V  provides empirical 
results of the financial profile of going private companies and their compliance with forecasts 
of the hypotheses verified. Finally, section VI presents a brief summary of the findings. 
Empirical research conducted uses data on transactions of going private available 
through the end of 2004. Thus it broadens the scope of the analysis of previous empirical 
results based on data for a shorter period and published earlier in Polish (Jackowicz and 
Kowalewski, 2004). 
This paper should enrich the findings of previous research in three ways. First, it adjusts 
explanations for going private transactions presented in earlier literature for the developing   3
markets to conditions in a post-communist economy. Second, it tests the formulated 
hypotheses using a data set that has not yet been analyzed. Third, it provides a unique 
illustration of the significance of foreign ownership in going private transactions and in some 
cases - the choices made by governmental authorities concerning the privatization method of 
state enterprises. 
2. Going Private Transactions in Poland 
From the beginning of 1998 till the end of 2004, 33 companies have gone private. 31 did 
so as a result of so-called regular delisting and 2 did so as a result of cold delisting related to 
their transformation into limited liability companies. The number of going private transactions 
related to the total number of listed companies on the WSE in particular years is presented in 
Table 1. 
[TABLE 1] 
Wedel S.A. was the first entity, which went private in Poland. This transaction took 
place, as we have already mentioned, in 1998.  However, one had to wait, until 2002, for an 
increase in the number of transactions going private and for an impact on the total number of 
companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Apart from factors having a microeconomic 
nature,  that we attempt to identify in  a section devoted to the presentation of research results, 
the following factors, a slowdown in the rate of economic growth, and a general decrease in 
the level of share prices, may have been conducive to the rise of going private transactions in 
Poland in 2001-2002. 
When characterizing  the going private transactions made in Poland we  focus on: (1) 
characteristics of going private companies, (2) types of initiating entities, (3) efficiency of 
obtaining the goal, and (4) officially presented motives. 
Companies that went private in Poland were, in the majority, mature business entities. 
When the stock market was recreated, they had operated for forty years on average. The   4
majority of them (27 out of 33) constituted state-owned enterprises before entering the stock 
market. Most of these companies were from the manufacturing sector (mainly food, drink, 
tobacco and machinery). Data on the structure of companies that went private using criteria 
resulting from the European Classification of Activities (EKD) are presented in Table 2. 
[TABLE 2] 
Entities initiating the processes in question may be divided according to country of 
origin and the type of relationship between them and the going private companies. Slightly 
more than 75% of going private transactions were made in Poland by foreign investors (see 
Table 3). It was assumed in Table 3 that the country where the registered office of the parent 
company is situated determined the geographic origin of the investor. In practice, a 
representative of the parent company in Poland initiated the transaction in a majority of cases. 
Hydrobudowa is a good example. This entity went private at the request of a Polish subsidiary 
– NCC Polska sp. z o.o. - of the Swedish company NCC AB. 
[TABLE 3] 
In the situation where going private transactions are initiated by entities that are 
stakeholders for more than a year, we have the so-called insider buy-out. In other cases one 
may talk about an outsider buy-out.  In Poland 70% of the transactions in question were 
initiated by long-term strategic shareholders in the time period studied. This is illustrated in 
Table 4. It should be noted that on only two occasions investors were not the active entities. 
This was the case of the going private transaction of the company Zasada that was initiated by 
its founder and also the case of the company, Wafapomp, that was initiated by the employee 
company POWEN SA. Since the first company went private not a single transaction in Poland 
has been initiated by a financial investor. 
[TABLE 4]   5
The main criterion  for evaluating the efficiency of going private transactions is the time 
necessary to complete the operation. Analysis of the Polish experience shows that the period 
from the announcement of the intention of going private, until the moment a relevant 
resolution is adopted by the General Shareholders’ Meeting, is approximately 2.18 months. 
From the moment the resolution of the General Shareholders’ Meeting is adopted until the 
moment listings ceased 4.97 months elapsed on average. Therefore, going private transaction 
required slightly more than 7 months in Poland. For purposes of comparison, according to 
Zillmer (2002, pp. 494), going private transactions in Germany, from the moment a resolution 
of the General Shareholders’ Meeting is passed until listings cease, took 12.5 months on 
average in the years 1996–2001. The  relatively quickly conducted going private transactions 
in Poland are a testimony to the effectiveness of activities undertaken by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and a lack of serious objections from minority shareholders  at the 
time of this analysis. 
Initiators of going private transactions announce their official motives for the decision to 
the public. As a rule, several reasons are mentioned. Table 5 shows how often the most 
popular official justifications for going private transactions are given based on the their order 
in lists included in the resolutions of the General Shareholders’ Meeting, information 
forwarded to the Securities and Exchange Commission, or in the company’s  press 
announcements. In light of data included in Table 5, the following should be recognized as the 
most important reasons for the transformation of public companies into private companies in 
Poland: illiquidity of a company’s shares and a desire to reorganize business activities. It is 
interesting that the unattractiveness of the stock market as a source of funding is rarely 
presented as the first motive, but often as the second one. It may be that the lack of 
enthusiasm for the stock market is  related to its short period of operation. Presenting this 
motive as the most important one would call into question the rationality of listing the   6
company several years earlier. In general, official motives should be treated with considerable 
caution. In several cases the conduct of owners after going private showed that they had goals 
other than those that had  been previously announced. 
[TABLE 5] 
3. Review of the Literature and its Applicability to Polish Conditions  
Possible explanations of motives for going private transactions offered in the previous 
literature can, in our view, be divided into three groups. In the first we include those theories 
that highlight the motives for activities undertaken by shareholders of going private 
companies, i.e. hypotheses related to agency problems associated with the occurrence of free 
cash flows, and wealth redistribution from different groups of stakeholders to shareholders. 
The second group consists of theories that mainly focus on managerial incentives. In this 
group, theories of information asymmetry and market inefficiency are highlighted, as well as 
are managerial motives to control and diversify the resources under their control. The third 
and last group of factors distinguished in the literature gives paramount importance to issues 
from the general sphere of rational management such as reduction of costs and a decrease in 
tax burdens. 
The explanation of going private transactions, included in the first group in the form of 
the hypothesis of agency problems costs of free cash flows, is decidedly the most popular in 
the literature. It was first developed by Jensen (1989), who claimed that the publicly held 
corporation as an organizational form of business activity has outlived its usefulness in many 
sectors. This theory has been followed up by several  works including Lehn et al. (1989), Rao 
et al. (1995), Weir et al. (2002), and Andres et al. (2004). According to this hypothesis, in the 
case of mature industries that develop slowly, there are few available investment projects with 
positive NPV, that give the company an abundant free cash flow. Therefore, the discrepancy 
between the interests of managers and shareholders becomes particularly acute. Shareholders   7
have a preference for the disbursement of this free cash flow, while managers may prefer to 
reinvest it to increase the scale of business activities and to improve their position on the 
labour market even if these steps result in decreasing shareholders’ wealth (Denis, 1992). 
Going private transactions may mitigate the agency problem described above through an 
increase in the share of managers’ ownership in a firm and the increased financial leverage 
that is particularly associated with LBOs. Increasing the level of debt puts pressure on 
managers to perform and reduces the cash flow available for spending at their discretion 
(Jensen, 1986). Thus, management incentives grow because of increased monitoring by 
stakeholders and active investors of the company, and by the growing threat of job loss in the 
event of poor performance (Gilson, 1989). 
The mitigation of agency cost of free cash flows is one of the most often cited sources 
for going private transactions shareholders’ gains. Going private reduce the possibility for 
managers to waste the free cash flows instead of distributing them to shareholders (Jensen 
1986, 1989). This hypothesis assumes that entities active in the going private transactions act 
in accordance with general business ethics. The starting point of the hypothesis of transfer of 
wealth from different groups of stakeholders (employees, creditors) towards shareholders 
(Ippolito et al., 1992; Andres et al., 2004) is different. The previously mentioned transfer is 
possible owing to a breach of implicit contracts concluded with stakeholders during the course 
of a going private transaction. In the literature special attention is devoted to the transfer of 
wealth arising from the early termination of pension programs with a defined benefit and the 
appropriation by shareholders of excess assets (Ippolito et al., 1992). The empirically strong 
positive correlation between the likelihood of terminating a pension program with defined 
benefits and the fact of going private was not always interpreted with the same 
censoriousness. To illustrate, Chaplinsky, Niehaus, Van de Gucht (1998) perceive that gaining 
access to excess assets of pension plans in the transaction in question, if accompanied by an   8
increase in the share in employee ownership, as financial assistance in the purchase of shares 
is acceptable. Such an action helps decrease the scale of financial leverage and improve the 
ability of a company to service debt in the future. 
A conviction about the undervaluation of shares may constitute an incentive for 
managers (but also for the dominant owner) to conduct the going private transaction. Potential  
reasons for the undervaluation of shares are as follows: the asymmetry of information and the 
inefficiency of the market. The most important area where the asymmetry of information is 
visible is the difference in the correctness of evaluating the value of assets by entities having 
access to inside information in a company and external observers. Inefficiency of the market 
in the area of valuation of a company most often results from the small scale of the so-called 
free float (Maupin, 1987; Lehn et al., 1989; Rao et al, 1995; Jansen et al., 2003; C. Andres et 
al, 2004). 
Another explanation of the reasons for going private (besides one assuming the 
existence of the asymmetry of information), that focuses mainly on factors shaping the 
conduct of managers is the diversification – control hypothesis. (Elitzur et al., 1998). It 
assumes that managers who wish to maintain control over a company attempt to increase their 
share in the ownership structure. However, as a result of such conduct, there is a strong 
concentration of financial investment portfolios in the hands of managing personnel, and thus 
they are subject to serious exposure to non-systematic risk. Going private transactions create 
opportunities for the transformation of the capital structure of a company, so that the 
managers may maintain or increase their shareholding by utilizing financial leverage. At the 
same time, they may decrease the amount invested in the company. As a result, the degree of 
diversification of managers’ financial investment portfolios improves.  
Advocates of the motive for a decrease in costs stress that going private allows for a 
reduction both in costs directly related to public listings (e.g. the maintenance of investor   9
relationships, frequent preparation of financial statements, organizing and holding general 
meetings for a large number of shareholders) the and costs related to alack of flexibility in  
information policy, loss of business opportunities as a result of the necessity for supplying  
more  information, and information asymmetry in a situation where the main competitors 
operate as non-public companies (Maupin, 1987; Jansen et al., 2003; Andres et al., 2004). The 
decrease in tax burdens, on the other hand, is associated with going private transactions 
mainly because of an increase in the role of liabilities in the capital structure of a firm during 
its course (Lehn et al. 1989; Andres et al., 2004). 
The majority of empirical studies testing the above hypotheses use data from the US 
stock markets. However, the results obtained are not unequivocal. As an example, in the case 
of the hypothesis of agency problems costs of free cash flows most often subjected to 
verification, arguments in support of it are provided by: Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Denis 
(1992), Opler and Titman (1993) and Rao, Waters and Payne (1995). On the other hand, there 
is no such support in the research of Servaes (1994) and Kieschnik (1998). At the same time, 
work by Halpern, Kieschnik and Rotenberg (1999) underlines the need to exercise caution 
when interpreting the results of earlier investigations because of the heterogenic nature of 
going private transactions in the United States. However, a lack of consensus in conclusions 
resulting from the analysis of the US experience related to going private transactions does not 
constitute the main obstacle to utilizing this part of the literature in designing our study. The 
principal difficulty is connected with the incompatibility of the structure of the US economy 
and the characteristics of companies operating with the Polish reality at the break of 20
th and 
21
st  centuries.  From this perspective, research based on data from the developed countries of 
Western Europe are of greater, although still limited, use. Andres, Betzer and Hoffmann 
(2004) observed that for European Union member states and Norway, companies that went 
private in the period 1996 – 2002 had relatively undervalued shares. Observed abnormal   10
returns were higher when there was a greater reduction in market monitoring as a result of 
share dispersion. Jansen and Klezmer (2003) confirmed agency problems connected with free 
cash flows for the German capital market in the period 1997-2001. They also noticed that in 
the estimated models, there was a strong positive relationship between concentration of 
ownership and the likelihood of going private. In the British capital market (Weir et al., 2002; 
Weir et al., 2003), on the other hand, going private companies differed from control samples 
of non-going private companies in the area of corporate governance in terms of the details of 
solutions as well as in future development prospects. 
As for the Polish capital market, we do not know any results of formal investigations 
into going private transactions that were previously conducted, The phenomenon of the initial 
public offering of shares has recently been subjected to econometric analysis (Dudko-
Kopczewska, 2004) in Poland.  Because of the lack of previous research results for the 
motivation for going private, conducted in conditions comparable with the Polish ones from 
the 1998-2004, we are guided by theoretical reasoning in choosing the hypotheses to be 
tested.  Our starting point will be defining the level of compatibility of the assumptions made 
in each hypothesis, prepared for developed financial markets, with the specificity of the 
functioning  of the Polish economy and the Polish capital market. 
At the heart of the hypothesis of agency problems costs of free cash flows are implicit 
assumptions that shareholding in public companies is generally dispersed and the role of 
foreign investors in comparison with home country investors is slight. These assumptions are 
fulfilled in the United States, but do not correspond to economic realities in other countries.  
In Australia, for example, foreign investors control approximately 32% of shares of 
companies listed  on the Australian Stock Exchange (Poa et al., 2001). In Germany, we 
encounter a highly concentrated ownership structure (Jansen et al., 2003). Clearly, these 
assumptions cannot be regarded as valid in the Polish environment. Due to a high level of   11
ownership concentration and  the considerable significance of foreign investors, the likelihood 
of the free rider phenomenon occurring in the area of monitoring companies decreases as does 
the inefficiency of internal control mechanisms for the utilization of free cash flows. As a 
result, finding of statistically significant higher levels of free cash flows, smaller 
developmental perspectives and smaller degree of financial leverage utilization in going 
private companies foreseen by the hypothesis in question may mean, owing to the 
development stage of the company, a lack of attractiveness of the stock market as a source of 
funding, rather than signal the occurrence of specific agency problems. However, it seems to 
us that it is not possible to totally exclude the hypothesis of agency problems costs of free 
cash flows from the area of our interest for two reasons. First, 30% of the going private 
transactions in Poland were conducted by groups of investors who were shareholders for less 
than a year. Second, overwhelmingly, entities entering the stock exchange in Poland as part of 
the privatization process were mature (Kowalewski, 2004). 
The hypothesis of the transfer of wealth from employees or creditors as the explanation 
for the initiation of going private transactions in Polish conditions is seriously limited by two 
factors. First, in the period analyzed, employee pension programs were poorly developed. 
Second, banks still remain the largest capital provider for companies. In 2003, receivables 
from the non-financial sector constituted 27% of the GDP, whereas the value of bonds issued 
by companies equalled only 0.65% of the GDP (Jackowicz, 2004). The likelihood of a 
permanently profitable breach of implicit contracts concluded with creditors is inversely 
related to the level of their concentration. 
We identified 33 cases of going private transactions in Poland from 1998  through the 
third quarter of 2004. Only one involved an employees’ buyout and there were no cases of the 
process being initiated by managers (management buyout). This allows us to assume that, in 
the Polish environment, the significance of the hypotheses explaining going private   12
transactions from the angle of factors primarily determining the conduct of managers is more 
modest than in developed capital markets if we take into account the role of foreign investors. 
The conclusion applies primarily to the diversification – control hypothesis which requires 
considerable capital involvement from managers, and to a lesser extent, to the hypothesis of 
the asymmetry of information and the inefficiency of the capital market.  Asymmetry of 
information may occur not only in the relationships of managers and dispersed external 
investors, but also in relationships between the dominant shareholder and other investors. In 
the latter case, the problem of company undervaluation by the stock market may be acutely 
felt due to its shallow nature. 
Gains form going private could results from savings in direct cost, which are unique to a 
public company as opposed to a private company. Such cost include, but are not limited to, 
actual listing fees, analyst conferences, and the cost of annual general meetings. In addition to 
these direct costs there are also indirect costs of a public listing, such as cost resulting from 
the requirement to disclose information, which might lead to competitive disadvantages and 
the increase in regulatory constraints, which leads to reduced flexibility. In Polish conditions, 
it seems justified to extend the gains from going private to cover potential savings and 
benefits achieved thanks to the fuller integration of going private companies with their foreign 
owners. The desire to minimize tax burdens does not constitute, in our view, a rightful and 
intrinsic justification for the decision to go private. This view is supported by Opler and 
Titman (1993, pp. 1998) and  Jansen and Klezmer (2003). The statistically significant 
correlation of the level of tax burdens and the likelihood of conducting the transaction in 
question would be a side-effect of the companies’ having a considerable supplementary loan 
capacity resulting from not utilizing the opportunity to contract debts and generate high and 
stable cash flows, or may result from using debt to reduce agency problems.    13
In the following part of our paper, we will empirically test the three hypotheses 
explaining going private transactions: agency problems of free cash flows (bearing in mind 
objections made above as to other possible interpretations of the obtained results), the 
asymmetry of information and the inefficiency of the stock market as well as integration with 
the foreign owner and a reduction in costs. Owing to the weakening of the operation of the 
first two hypotheses, we expect to obtain confirmation for the superiority of the third 
explanation. 
4. Data and Methodology 
In order to analyze the determinants and motives for the likelihood of going private in 
Poland we used a probit model (Verbeek, 2000) like the one employed in the study of Rao, 
Waters and Payne (1995).  Literature on the subject shows that other econometric tools are 
also used for this purpose: linear probability models (M. Poa et al., 2001); discriminant 
analysis (Maupin 1987); and logit models (Lehn et al. 1989; C. Weir et al., 2002; C. Weir et 
al., 2003). 
The dependent variable (GP) is a qualitative attribute; it equals one if the company goes 
private in the analyzed period,  and zero if the company remains public. 
The set of independent variables was selected so as to create an opportunity to test the 
three hypotheses stated in the previous section describing the reasons for going private. In 
order to verify the hypothesis concerning agency problems of free cash flows, we introduced 
proxies describing: the level of free cash flows (FCFA); financial leverage (LTDA); and the 
dynamics of sales revenues (RSD). We approximated free cash flows, which according to 
Jensen, constitute an excess of cash flows over those required to finance projects with a 
positive NPV (a value which cannot be directly observed), using the sum of the cash flows 
from operating and financial activities. The occurrence of agency problems as well as a lack   14
of the need for funding via the stock market, lead us to expect a positive parameter for the 
FCFA variable and negative parameters for the LTDA and RSD variables.  
We tested the asymmetry of information and the inefficiency of the capital market by 
adding the next three proxies to the model describing differences in the market and book 
value of equity (MVBV); the level of abnormal market returns from shares of the companies 
covered by the study (YIELD); and the number of days without shares trading for particular 
company (V0). Since the hypothesis analyzed predicts that companies undervalued by the 
stock market go private, we should obtain negative estimates of the parameters for the MVBV 
and YIELD variables and a positive estimate for the V0 variable.  
To test the hypothesis of integration and the decrease in costs, we employed two proxies 
used separately in the estimated models (due to their high correlation). A dummy variable 
denoting whether the given entity belonged to a foreign entity (FOREIGN) prior to going 
private will take the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. The second variable is a product of the 
FOREIGN variable and an indicator of ownership concentration in the hands of the largest 
shareholder. We named it FORCON. A positive sign of the variables for both proxies would 
confirm the hypothesis. 
Additionally, in all estimated models, we used a proxy for profitability which will be  
operationalized as a return on assets (ROA). We assume that the lower the effectiveness of 
operation, the greater the need to introduce organizational changes, including those made in 
conjunction  with going private transactions.  
All the proxy variables, with the exception of the binary variable, were computed as a 
mean over a period of three years immediately preceding the dates when the firms went 
private. Table 6 provides information about the variables, their operational definitions, and the 
predicted signs. 
[TABLE 6]   15
The estimation of the probit model is based on a set of information concerning the going 
private companies and entities grouped in the control samples. 
No systematic documentation is available in Poland concerning going private 
transactions, delisting, or merging of companies on the WSE. Therefore, in order to identify 
companies that should be covered by this study, we used annual reports of the Polish 
Securities and Exchange Commission and statistical yearbooks of the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange. Based on these documents we identified 33 cases of going private companies from 
the moment when the stock exchange was created in 1991 till the end of 2004. In accordance 
with the approach adopted in the literature we excluded an insurance institution. The 
elimination of another company was necessary because of the lack of data necessary for 
calculating the proxies. Thus, the final number in the original sample of 33 companies was 
reduced to 31, constituting the final going private sample of this study. 
The issue of choosing the proper method for the selection of public companies in the 
control groups is not resolved in the relevant literature. Some studies use an industry adjusted 
sample as a control group (Maupin, 1987; Lehn et al., 1989; M. Poa et al., 2001; C. Weir et 
al., 2002), while other studies use the method of random sampling (Rao et al, 1995; Halpern 
et al, 1999; Jansen et al, 2003). One can also find studies where the  entire population of 
publicly listed companies  is used as a control group (Opler et al., 1993). If we take into 
account the diversity of solutions in the existing literature on the one hand, and the fact that it 
would require much effort to a mass financial data given Polish conditions. We decided to 
form three control groups of sample firms: an industry adjusted group according to the EKD 
code, a randomly selected group of listed companies and a group formed as a result of a 
merger of the two groups. The first two groups consist of 31 elements each and the third, 
clearly, of 62 elements. This will allow us to evaluate the extent to which the research results 
depend on the manner of constructing the control group.   16
The number of entities in a group, on the basis of which the models were estimated, is 
not large. In the previous literature, the number of cases of going private transactions ranges 
from 54, in the study by Maupin (1987), to 263 in the study of Lehn and Poulsen (1989). 
The estimation of the model required a massing a large set of data on 93 business 
entities. We acquired it primarily from the database IMS Emerging Markets and Notoria 
services. Unavailable data concerning earlier accounting periods were taken from the annual 
statements of companies listed on the stock exchange SA-R. We created the missing 
information about listings of shares of the companies based on the official bulletin of the 
Stock Exchange „Ceduła”. The necessary macroeconomic data came from statistical 
yearbooks published by the Central Statistical Office. The database constructed in this way 
contains approximately 3,800 items of data in total. 
5. Empirical Results  
Table 7 below presents the results of research into the statistical significance of mean 
differences for independent variables selected in section 4 for the group of going private 
companies and three control groups. 
[TABLE 7] 
In all cases where the rejection of the null hypothesis on the equality of means is 
possible, the test statistics have the expected signs. Indeed, companies that  left the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange are characterized by a statistically significant greater number of days without 
trading in shares in the three years immediately preceding this event, a higher concentration of 
the shareholding structure, and the fact that they are more likely to constitute foreign property. 
Additionally, they have a lower return on assets in comparison with entities from the industry 
adjusted sample control group and a relatively higher level of free cash flows when compared 
with the randomly selected sample control group. The results obtained speak, in a preliminary 
manner, in favour of the explanations of the going private phenomenon in Poland as being   17
related to the integration of activities with the foreign owner and the lack of liquidity in shares 
trading. 
The determinants to going private in Poland are described, in a more precise manner, by 
results of the estimation of probit models presented in Table 8. Apart from the values of 
parameter and the t-statistic estimates, the three tables contain elements of diagnostics of the 
models obtained, including information on the precision of the classifications of companies 
within the sample used. 
[TABLE 8] 
The six estimated specifications of the probit model for the phenomenon of going 
private transactions in Poland are characterized by good econometric properties. The sets of 
explanatory variables used in all cases significantly affect the likelihood of going private. The 
null hypothesis (about the lack of joint influence) in the appropriate test may always be 
rejected at the significance level of 1%.  In specifications 1, 2 and 5, apart from the constant 
term, there are four individual statistically significant independent variables in each case and 
in the remaining specifications – three variables in each case. McFadden’s R
2 ratios range 
from 30.40% for the fifth specification to 56.37% for the fourth specification. In the case of 
models with a binary dependent variable, these are satisfactory values. They demonstrate that 
the estimated models are considerably better than the model containing only a constant as an 
explanatory variable. Additionally, it is worth noting that reaching convergence in the process 
of estimating model parameters required five (specification 1) to seven iterations 
(specification 5). 
Of the three constructed models using the combined control groups, the random group, 
and the industry adjusted group, the third one is characterized by the poorest goodness of fit. 
It has relatively small values of McFadden’s R
2 ratio and relatively high values of the Akaike 
information criterion. It also offers a poorer precision of classification of companies making   18
up the samples. Specifications 5 and 6 identify correctly 74.19% and 77.42% of cases of 
going private companies and 83.87% and 80.65% of cases of maintaining shares in trading on 
the stock exchange until the end of the time subject to the analysis respectively. The estimated 
models for combined control groups classify correctly 83.87% and 87.10% of all companies 
included in the sample. Specifications 3 and 4 provide incorrect values in only 14.52% and 
11.29% of cases. 
In general, in models that used the FORCON variable, taking into account the degree of 
ownership concentration in the hands of the largest shareholder instead of the variable 
identifying the entities controlled by foreign investors, seems to be most beneficial. 
Additionally, the analysis of the values of McFadden’s R
2 ratios, the Akaike information 
criterion and the percentages of correct classifications of entities from the sample lead to this 
conclusion. 
In the economic interpretation of the results obtained, the following three conclusions of 
a general nature may be formulated. First, in a situation of individual statistical significance of 
explanatory variables, parameters estimated for them always have the expected signs (Table 
6). For non-significant variables, the signs of the parameters do not comply with the expected 
signs for all specifications for variables describing: the relation between the market and book 
valuation of equity (MVBV); and an above market rate of return from shares (YIELD). 
Second, results obtained confirm to a large extent the hypothesis of integration and decrease 
of costs, and to a lesser degree – the hypothesis of agency problems and the unattractiveness 
of the stock market as a source of funding. The most unequivocal is the result of the test of the 
hypothesis of asymmetry of information and the inefficiency of the capital market. Third, the 
manner in which the control groups were created has a negligible impact on the general 
interpretation of the results obtained.   19
The proxies testing the significance of the motive of integration with the foreign owner 
and the decrease of costs: FOREIGN and FORCON are statistically significant in all 
specifications and, in line with our expectations, increase the likelihood of going private. In 
five out of six specifications the null hypothesis on the lack of influence of these variables on 
the likelihood of going private may be rejected at the significance level of 1% and in one case 
– at the significance level of 5%. The conclusion concerning the determinants of going private 
companies emerging is thus similar to the one obtained by Jansen and Klezmer (2003, pp. 26) 
for the German capital market. These authors noticed that the likelihood of conducting the 
described process depended, to a large extent, on the degree of ownership concentration. 
In the versions of the models estimated using the combined control groups and the 
control group selected randomly, the likelihood of going private increased in a statistically 
significant manner with the increase of the relative level of free cash flows (FCFA). In 
specifications 1, 2, 5 and 6, on the other hand, the likelihood of the event in question 
decreased in  a statistically significant manner with an increase in the level of financial 
leverage (LTDA). Both of the relationships identified may be seen as a confirmation of the 
occurrence of agency problems related to free cash flows in the entities deciding to leave the 
stock market. As we have strongly argued in section 3, in Polish conditions, this may also be a 
signal that the company does not feel, due to its stage of development, the need to acquire 
further capital in the stock market. The third proxy testing the hypothesis of agency problems, 
RDS, is never statistically significant, although it has the expected sign of the estimated 
parameter in all specifications. One of the reasons for the non-significance of the RDS 
variable may be, as suggested by Lehn and Poulsen (1989, pp. 777-778), the fact that the 
average dynamics of sales revenues does not reflect the developmental prospects of the 
company well, if its managers follow a growth strategy through aggressive acquisitions.   20
Of the proxies testing the hypothesis of asymmetry of information and inefficiency of 
the capital market, only the average number of days without trading influences the likelihood 
of going private in a statistically significant manner and in the foreseen direction in all 
specifications. Proxies describing the potential market undervaluation of companies from the 
sample: MVBV and YIELD are statistically non-significant. At the same time, these variables 
have the positive signs of estimated parameters which are contrary to expectations. The same 
anomaly was observed in the German capital market (Jansen et al, 2003). In research using 
data from the US and British capital markets, there was a negative influence of the increase of 
the market valuation of equity in relation to the book value on the likelihood of going private 
(Ippolito et al., 1992; Weir et al, 2002). In summary, although we provided evidence that 
going private companies were characterized by a lower liquidity in trading in their shares, we 
cannot  establish the simultaneous occurrence of undervaluation caused by the asymmetry of 
information in Polish circumstances. 
Moreover, the likelihood of going private decreases in specification 5 with  an increase 
of the effectiveness of operation measured by the ratio return on assets (ROA).  We observe a 
similar dependence almost reaching the level of statistical significance for specification 1.  
Compared with the results of research into the motives of going private we announced in 
Polish based on smaller samples, we noted two differences (Jackowicz and Kowalewski, 
2004). The results described above indicate the relatively higher significance of illiquidity in 
shares trading and the less important role of the return on assets on the decision to go private.  
6. Conclusions 
The phenomenon of going private is associated mainly with developed financial 
markets. Empirical research conducted till now into the reasons for its occurrence is based, in 
the majority of cases, on data from the US capital market and the capital markets of Western 
European countries. This paper supplements findings described in the literature with   21
experience from a young Polish capital market (created in 1991). The theoretical and 
empirical analyses carried out lead to two basic conclusions. First, standard explanations  for 
the phenomenon of going private companies in previous literature requires reformulation and 
reinterpretation in the circumstances of developing markets. Second, decisions to leave the 
stock market in the period 1999 - 2004 in Poland were taken mainly because of the desire to 
further integrate activities with the foreign owner, the non-attractiveness of the stock market 
as a source of funding, and the illiquidity of shares trading. Results obtained in the study are 
significant for investors wishing to identify entities with a high likelihood of going private, 
and for government authorities in terms of evaluating the rationality of some of the 
privatization paths of mature state-owned enterprises in Poland in the 1990s.    22
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Table 1 
Number of going private transactions related to the number of listed companies  
on the WSE 
 
Year  Number of Going Private 
companies 
Going Private / Number of 
companies listed at the 
beginning of period 
1998 1  0.70% 
1999 2  1.01% 
2000 3  1.36% 
2001 2  0.89% 
2002 11  4.78% 
2003 8  3.70% 
2004 6  3.94% 
Total (or average)  33  2.34%   25
Table 2 
Structure of going private companies in Poland according to EKD code 
 
EKD Sector  Number 
10 -14  Mining  1 
15 - 37  Manufacturing  23 
45 Construction  3 
50 - 52  Wholesale and retail commerce  2 
60 - 64  Financial intermediation  1 
70 - 74  Real estate services  3 
   26
Table 3 
Initiators of the going private transactions in Poland according to country of origin 
 









The United States  5 
The United Kingdom  2 
Total  34
* 
* In one case a going private transaction was initiated by two investors (Austrian and German). 
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Table 4 
Initiators of going private transactions divided according to type of relationship 
 with the company 
 
Initiators: 
Number of going private 
companies 
Share in the total number of 







Founders 1  3.03% 
Strategic investors  21  63.64% 







Investors 10  30.30% 
Total 33  100% 
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Table 5 
Official motives offered about decisions for going private transactions in Poland 
 
Motives: 
Percentage of cases 
when motive was 
listed as the first one
Percentage of cases 
when motive was 
listed as  
the second one 
Illiquidity of companies’ shares  39%  24% 
Consolidation of activities with another entity 
or inclusion in holding structures  24%  18% 
High cost of maintaining listings  18%  15% 
Restriction of access to information about 
business activities of the company  12%  9% 
No need for additional financing through the 
stock market  3%  27% 
Other motives or motives  that were not 
identified 4%  7% 
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Table 6 
Explanatory variables, their operational definitions and predicted signs 
 
Variable  Operational Definitions  Predicted Sign 
 
FCFA   Sum of cash flows from operating and financial activities
 divided by total assets   + 
LTDA   Value of long-term debt divided by total assets  - 
RSD   Geometric average of annual growth rate of sale 
revenues  - 
 
MVBV   Market value of the company to book value.   - 
YIELD   Average return from shares of a given entity after 
 deducting the return offered by the market index WIG.  - 
V0   Number of days without trading in shares of a given  
 company during the year.  + 
 
FOREIGN 
 Dummy variable = 1 if entities controlled by foreign 
investors 
 and 0 – in other cases.  
+ 
FORCON 
 Product of the FOREIGN variable and the indicator of 




ROA   Net income divided by total assets.  - 
   30
Table 7 













companies and a 
control group 
selected according to 
sectors 
FCFA  1.1549 2.0467
** 0.2220 
LTDA  -1.1954 -0.6145  -1.3412 
RSD  0.7051 1.1038  -0.0485 
MVBV  1.0109 1.0356  0.9752 













ROA  -1.3549 -0.2873  -2.7421
*** 
# The table presents results of t-statistic for continuous variables, for binary variables –  the z statistic from the 
binomial test is listed instead of a t - statistic;  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   31
Table 8 
Results of estimation and diagnostics of a probit model for going private 
 companies in Poland – combined control groups (1,2); random control group (3,4); 
adjusted control group (5,6) 
 
Number of the specification 
of the model:  1 2 3 4 5 6 













** (1.26)  (1.07) 
-5.4556 -5.3369 -3.3750 -3.6948 -6.1010 -6.0635  LTDA 
(-2.29)
** (-2.09)
** (-1.35)  (-1.23) (-2.31)
** (-2.16)
** 
-0.1120 -0.5415 -0.9128 -2.3586 -0.1580 -0.4981  RSD 
(-0.118) (-0.514) (-0.757)  (-1.43)  (-0.145) (-0.419) 
0.0396 0.0436 0.0520 0.0947 0.0467 0.0606  MVBV 
(0.635) (0.415) (0.440) (0.677) (0.398) (0.442) 
0.1384 0.4173 0.4083 1.0552 0.0414 0.3023  YIELD 
(0.219) (0.593) (0.521)  (1.19) (0.0572)  (0.388) 








1.1677 1.5359   
  0.9449   








2.6199   
  3.8301   
  2.1814 
FORCON   
 
(4.47)
***  ( 3 . 6 5 )
***  (3.40)
*** 
-3.6509 -3.1376 -2.2747 -1.0956 -5.5510 -5.1279  ROA 
(-1.63) (-1.28)  (-0.773)  (-0.349)  (-1.78)
* (-1.53) 
Elements of diagnostics 
Number  of  observations 93 93 62 62 62 62 
Test of joint statistical 











2  34.89% 45.36% 44.93% 56.37% 30.40% 39.48% 
Akaike  information  criterion  1.0224 0.8891 1.0537 0.8952 1.2552 1.1293 
Correctness of classification within the sample using the model 
Percentage of correctly 
identified non going private 
companies (specificity) 
90.32% 90.32% 80.65% 90.32% 74.19% 77.42% 
Percentage of correctly 
identified going private 
companies  (sensitivity) 
70.97% 80.65% 90.32% 87.10% 83.87% 80.65% 
Total percentage of correct 
classifications  83.87% 87.10% 85.48% 88.71% 79.03% 79.03% 
t - statistic values are in parentheses;  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
levels, respectively. 
 
 